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Abstract
Resilience is closely related to notions of sustainability,
but emphasizes unpredictable, dynamic environments. As
conceptualized in engineering, hazards management, and
ecology literature, part of resilience is adaptive capacity, the
ability to react effectively to change over time in order to
maintain a desirable system state. Agricultural policy has
had the effect of undermining such adaptive capacity with its
emphasis on stabilization. Using a resilience framework and
Hurricane Katrina as an analogy, we suggest that the emphasis on stability and efficiency degrades agricultural system resilience in two ways: through reduced diversity in size
and type of production, as well as reduced ability to change
production regimes based on the primary operator’s judgment of social, environmental, and economic conditions; and,
through the reduction of adaptive capacity by artificially stabilizing the system and eliminating feedback mechanisms that
make adaptation possible. The resulting stagnation or loss of
economic and political power lowers the resilience of the system and thus its long-term sustainability.
Keywords: resilience, sustainability, adaptive capacity,
agriculture, U.S. agricultural policy

Introduction
Development of the concept of resilience in fields such
as engineering, ecology, and psychology (Manyena, 2006)
has complemented research using existing vulnerability
frameworks that focus on the root causes of disaster (Wisner
et al., 2004). In the field of hazards and disaster studies, re-
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silience mostly has been used to refer to reducing disaster impacts, in ways very similar to Holling’s (1973) original use of
the concepts of stability and persistence. As Holling discussed, a resilient system would be able to absorb disturbances and eventually recover so that vital components of the
system such as its plants and animals would still retain the
same basic, expected functions and interactions (Walker &
Salt, 2006). Resilience is necessary and desirable precisely
because most environments, even those that humans attempt
to stabilize and manipulate on gross scales, are dynamic, uncertain, and prone to disturbance or change.
In ecological literature, resilience describes a system’s
ability to remain in a distinct state, and to persist by responding adequately to and adapting to changes internal or external
to the system (Carpenter et al., 2001; Gunderson et al., 2010;
Holling, 1973). Matthews & Selman (2006) build on the
ideas of Gunderson and Holling (2001) who wrote on the dynamics of adaptive cycles leading to changes in such distinct
states (Gunderson & Holling, 2001; Matthews & Selman,
2006). Resilience also can be characteristic of socio-ecological systems (Allison & Hobbes, 2004; Langridge et al., 2006)
— particularly, regarding the ability to sustain a desirable
standard of living over extended periods of time (Swanson et
al., 2009). Resilience, then, depends on an ability to live with
change and uncertainty, and utilize a wide range of knowledge and perspectives especially regarding land use practices
(Folke et al., 2003).
Resilience thinking also offers a means of expanding on
ideas of system sustainability with its emphasis on unpredictable, dynamic environments and building the necessary
adaptive capacity to render a system viable (Walker & Salt,
2006). Sustainability has well informed this discussion to
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date, with a large body of scholarship in agricultural applications.
This essay builds on approaches from disaster studies
that extend to socio-economic change and can be fruitfully
applied to agricultural sector resilience concerns in United
States (U.S.) agriculture. Besides discussing agricultural
cases, this essay highlights the consequences of a catastrophic event such as Katrina as another example of resilience
thinking, with its engineered stabilization regimes similar to
typical policy approaches used in constructing U.S. agricultural policy.

Sustainability and resilience
Ideas of sustainability in agriculture are not new, with
usage increasing after 1987 with the Brundtland Commission’s work in defining and expanding upon what was meant
by “sustainable development” (Brundtland Commission,
1987; Harwood, 1990). Central to the idea of “sustainable” is
that present practices should not compromise the natural resource base of future generations. However, the means by
which sustainability is accomplished (and perhaps measured)
is subject to much discussion and debate. Certainly, what has
come to be known as conventional agriculture (high input,
high yield, mono-cropped) was hoped to have been “sustainable” in the early days of the Green Revolution (Everson &
Gollin, 2003).
MacRae (1990) argues that concepts of sustainability
were present in English agriculture up until the repeal of the
Corn Laws (import tariffs designed to protect corn prices in
the United Kingdom in the early-mid 1800s). Harwood notes
numerous examples of integrated farming in the 19th century
U.S. that helped “shape perceptions of appropriate production practices” (1990, p. 5). Similar ideas of “appropriate”
production were gaining momentum in Central Europe, following the influential Agriculture Lectures of Rudolf Steiner
in 1924, which eventually grew into the biodynamic movement (Steiner, 1993). During the Dust Bowl years of the early
20th Century in the United States, the Soil Conservation Service was created in an effort to inventory and sustain the nation’s soil resources (Harlow, 1994). “Organic” agriculture
appeared by the 1950s, being popularized by Robert Rodale
(MacRae, 1990) as a regenerative agriculture, possibly part of
a larger resistance to the rapid industrialization following the
Second World War (Ikerd, 2004). Such regenerative agriculture focused on the renewal of natural systems, eschewing
chemical inputs that might comprise eco-biological processes within systems.
Sustainable agriculture as a system was legitimized in
U.S. farm policy in the 1985 Farm Bill, or Food Security Act
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of 1985 (Ikerd, 2004). This bill introduced the Low-Input
Sustainable Agriculture Program and was intended to increase scientific knowledge in the reduction of chemical inputs used in food and feed production. With the passage of
the 1990 Farm Bill, the program was renamed as the Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education Program, the name
it continues under today (Gold, 2007).
The 1990 Farm Bill defined sustainable agriculture as an
integrated system of plant and animal production, one that
satisfied food and fiber needs while enhancing environmental
quality, promoting efficient use of natural resources, and
maintaining the economic viability of farmers and community (Cibulka, 2009). This definition clearly integrates the longterm perspective of the Brundtland Commission with Rodale’s emphasis on environmental health. There is an emphasis on stability and efficiency, as noted also in Alternative
Agriculture produced by the National Research Council
(1989). In a more recent report, the National Academy of Sciences focused on the dynamic nature of the agricultural environment and how a rather large, concerted effort in policy
change was needed to achieve sustainability (National Research Council, 2010). Others have written eloquently on the
subject of the meaning of sustainability, and raised concerns
about protection of critical agro-ecosystem services (Altieri,
1995; Altieri & Anderson, 1986; Saifi & Drake, 2008; Scherr
& McNeely, 2007; Warner, 2007). Saifi & Drake (2008) emphasize local interaction and interconnectedness in ruralurban contexts and also highlight the need for sustainability
indicators. Other important scholarship on sustainability indicators can be found in the work of Molly Anderson and colleagues (2009) and Rao & Rogers (2006). Other researchers
argue for new approaches that will integrate biological and
ecological processes into food production systems (Pretty,
2008) that will inevitably lead to adaptive management (Jackson et al., 2001) — very similar to ideas of building adaptive
capacity, discussed below.
At any one point in time, there are situations where resilience and sustainability can be treated as synonymous. The
element of resilience emphasized in this essay is the need for
adapting to the dynamic character of the system itself.
Resilience, as a framework for understanding environmental change and response, has been gaining considerable
respect and use in applications ranging from psychology
(Marshall et al., 2007) and socio-ecological systems (Carpenter et al., 2001; Folke, 2003) to community development
(Adger, 2000; Cumming et al., 2005). In this essay, we contend that applying resilience thinking to agricultural production systems and policy may shape important lines of inquiry
regarding agricultural policy and viability. Examples considered are the case of Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast (used
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here to show the application of resilience thinking in engineered systems, and also for Katrina’s impact on agriculture),
and U.S. agricultural policy itself, including an application of
the National Organic Program/Organic Rule and an inevitable consequence resulting from using conventional
sources of manure. Lastly, suggestions for changes in federal
policy and programs, using resilience thinking, are discussed.

Resilience and adaptive capacity
in agriculture
Agriculture itself represents a cultural shift from adaptation to natural seasonal fluctuations in “wild” food supply, to
more intensive investment of labor and other resources for
stability and predictability in caloric production via cultivation. Despite the obvious limitations of total dependence on
natural cycles, exposure to extreme events historically fostered a different understanding and expectation regarding uncertainty, and an obviously greater emphasis on developing
individual and group strategies for survival (Gunderson,
2008; Workman, 2009). The case of Island County, Washington, is particularly illustrative of how agricultural landscapes
have evolved over time. In his classic history of environmental change in Island County, White (1980) describes how the
area’s agroecology changed through time, from the indigenous Salish inhabitants, through white settlers, to 20th century land use. Native ecosystems produced vast quantities of
salmon, shellfish, marine mammals, deer, elk, nettles, and
camas for food. This natural harvest (and cultivation of
camas) was replaced with potatoes, domestic livestock, and
then a more diverse crop agriculture. White’s story of environmental change linked to agricultural development serves
as a case study — repeated with some variation, worldwide
— of resilience, and lack thereof. Island County’s ecology
experienced considerable reorganization over time, as the island’s ecology shifted from conifer forest to intensive market
agriculture, with a loss of soil fertility and sharp decreases in
expected yield. An element of resilience to be gleaned from
such histories, with modern relevance for protecting farm income as well as consumer prices and health, is the concept of
adaptive capacity.
Current research on understanding threats or hazard
events in agriculture is vigorous. Scholarship typically has
focused on natural hazards such as drought and famine (Alinovi et al., 2009; Allison & Hobbes, 2004; Conway, 1993;
Milestad, 2003; Myers, 2008; Ramjan & Athalye, 2008). Yet,
resilience concepts as a tool for planning using ideas such as
adaptive capacity have been little applied to the U.S. agricultural sector. System change may come from severe weather,
but also from social or economic factors such as high energy
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prices, technological innovation (as with the introduction of
donkey engines for hauling timber in Island County), or regional policies that encourage rapid urban sprawl (Klein &
Reganold, 1997). Such changes can be understood as socioeconomic hazards, which can overwhelm community resources and coping ability to the point of a long-term decline
in farm numbers, productivity, or farm acreage.
One understanding of adaptive capacity is that it is the
ability to react effectively to change, cope with difficulty in
novel ways, and ultimately take advantage of changing social, economic, and environmental conditions in order to
manage and maintain a desirable system state; such capacity
can mean the difference between disastrous change and gradual adaptation (Smit & Wandel, 2006). It incorporates ideas
of adaptability, coping ability, management capacity, and
flexibility (Adger & Kelly, 1999; Brooks, 2003; Fraser et al.,
2003; Füssel & Klein, 2006; Jones, 2001; Smit et al., 1999;
Smit & Wandel, 2006; Smithers & Smit, 1997; Tompkins &
Adger, 2004).
One complex change, common in developing agricultural systems, is the emergence of market agriculture. In the
case of Island County, market agriculture was introduced
(1860-1900) into an existing low-intensity agricultural system. Disruption of the native ecosystems resulted from sharp
increases in sheep, potatoes, and small grain production.
Many social and environmental consequences resulted, such
as invasive plant species management problems, and tension
between Chinese, Indian, and White populations. The adaptive capacity exemplified in complex natural systems no
longer provided a system buffer for disturbance.
In the early-third of the 20th century, national legislation
was passed that had the same effect of reducing agricultural
adaptive capacity and, thus, resilience. Farm Bills were written to address acute short-term problems such as near-starvation in the spring of 1933 and, later, the bank and farm credit crisis of the mid-1980s (due, in part, to overexpansion in
the 1970s). These bills stabilized extreme economic situations but neglected to address any other underlying social and
environmental factors, inevitably weakening the overall resilience of the system to disturbances such as price hikes in
energy or other costly external inputs.
A dramatic instance of stability being favored over resilience — the case of New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina —
well illustrates the trade-offs between stability and resilience.
Engineering solutions to what was a normal and regular feature of the landscape — seasonal flooding — had the effect
of stabilizing flood regimes. However, resilience decreased as
a result and an extreme event (Hurricane Katrina) led to catastrophic consequences. Regional agriculture suffered as
well.
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Stability in socio-ecological systems:
The case of Hurricane Katrina
On a larger socio-ecological scale, resilience is a measure of a community’s ability to cope with stress, and includes reducing overall economic loss, even as some individuals or groups may be severely disrupted. This is well illustrated in the case of Hurricane Katrina, discussed here to
show how a resilience thinking approach can be applied to
the ability of New Orleans, and the region’s agriculture, to
cope with and recover from a major hurricane.
In terms of change to human settlement and society, stability provides an attractive concept and goal for economic
and social development in the “get-back-to-normal-andmove-on” sense. Yet, focusing predominantly on enhancing
the stability of a system undermines the processes by which
a system adapts to changing environmental conditions. What
happened in New Orleans clearly illustrates how focusing on
enhancing the stability of a system (Colten, 2005; Freudenburg et al., 2010) may undermine the feedback mechanisms
and information processes (provided by, in this case, the frequency and extent of flood waters) by which a system adapts
to changing environmental conditions. Although a focus on
stability may function as an effective response to small
changes, it fails to be effective when disturbances are large.
In the New Orleans case, the decreased exposure to environmental cycles and the adaptive learning (for example, in
terms of selection of building materials) they typically would
have stimulated contributed to exacerbating the impacts when
the engineered levee systems were overwhelmed and failed.
Thus, the existence of feedback mechanisms is critical in providing information so as to adapt to cyclical and evolving
conditions.
In 1718, French explorers established New Orleans on
the banks of the Mississippi River where easy portage to the
Gulf of Mexico was found via Bayou St. John and Lake
Pontchartrain. New Orleans developed into an important
transportation hub where bulk goods barged from the continent’s interior could be transferred to seagoing vessels
(Freudenburg et al., 2010). In the 19th century, those with financial and social means crowded along the banks of the
river, built up over years of flooding to be above sea level.
This natural levee along the banks was both relatively high
and away from the swampy “back of town” inhabited by
freed slaves, indigenous peoples, and poor Cajuns (Campanella, 2006). Yet even on this natural levee, flooding
plagued residents. The Mississippi River fluctuated as much
as 15 feet, often spilling over its banks in spring; and summer
hurricanes brought storm surges that pushed Lake Pontchartrain waters inland, into the back of town (Freudenburg et al.,
2010). To reduce flood damage, traditional pre-20th century
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habitations were built on raised foundations several feet off
the ground, allowing floodwaters to pass underneath the
structures. Such architectural adaptation to seasonal variability ensured community persistence, despite frequent seasonal
variability (Colten, 2005).
While historic architectural styles and settlement patterns limited seasonal flood damage, 20th century residents
sought to eliminate the inconvenience of flooding altogether.
City officials dredged the lake and used sediment to build a
lip of high ground. Politicians and business elite acquired
federal funding for large-scale water management projects —
dams, levees, pumps, and shipping canals — all touted as
promoting economic development. Using federal funds, the
Army Corps of Engineers constructed an extensive levee system to surround the city, enclosing and draining the swampy
regions north and east of the river and selling the reclaimed
land to finance much of the system’s construction. While
these projects expanded the city’s footprint into land below
sea level, they also accelerated the destruction of cypress
marshes that had acted as a buffer to hurricane storm surge
(Colten, 2005; Freudenburg et al., 2010). In particular, shipping canals meant to benefit the economic elite sliced
through predominantly African-American, middle-class
neighborhoods in ways that would later expose them to
heightened storm surge from hurricanes (Freudenburg et al.,
2010; Green et al., 2007).
Without the need for raised housing, spatial patterns and
types of development changed to take advantage of the “stabilizing” levees. Building along the raised river banks on
high foundations — strategies that increased resilience —
were abandoned. As the population nearly doubled over the
20th century (Campanella, 2006), single story, ranch-style
housing, built directly on the ground, crowded into the
newly-drained lowlands, which began subsiding without the
sediment deposits that seasonal flooding brought (Campanella, 2006; Green et al., 2007). This new style of housing was
particularly cost-effective for a burgeoning middle class, and,
along with the collapse of “Jim Crow” (forced segregation)
laws, allowed many middle class African-Americans to move
out of the Ninth Ward and into newer suburban style communities away from the River’s edge (Bates & Green, 2009).
New Orleans’ 20th century population expansion, architecture, and settlement patterns — emerging from the elimination of seasonal flooding — resulted in a city highly vulnerable to flooding when Hurricane Katrina eventually toppled levees in August 2005. Prior to European settlement, the
entire area was at or above sea level; by 2005, 49 percent was
below sea level (Campanella, 2006) in housing that did not
have traditional architectural features that would have reduced flood impacts (Green et al., 2007). Over 70 percent of
all housing units within New Orleans Parish suffered major
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flood damage or severe damage and destruction due to the
failure of the levee system (Office of Policy Development and
Research, 2006). Historic raised houses along the river’s naturally high banks remained unflooded or experienced minor,
repairable flood damage, as did those at or near sea level and
with raised foundations (Green et al., 2007).
It is clear that New Orleans’ adaptive capacity had diminished over time. While the levee system had provided security from seasonal flooding and small storm surges, its capacity was limited. To reduce impacts from seasonal flooding
and small storm surges, an engineering approach to resilience
had been applied. The approach centered on reduced economic loss and rapid recovery from frequent disturbance
events (Bruneau et al., 2003; Miles & Chang, 2003; Shinozuka et al., 2003 - 2004). However, for an engineering approach
to resilience to be successful, it must prioritize redundancy of
fallback systems and resourcefulness, two attributes that form
a problem-solving strategy for achieving resilience goals and
reducing risk (Bruneau et al., 2003). The levee system of
New Orleans enhanced physical controls, stabilizing the area
by reducing the uncertainty of frequent flooding, but undermined the adaptive capacity of residents by removing the
need for non-engineered flood management strategies such as
wetland maintenance, avoidance of low-lying areas, and
raised foundations.
In the face of flooding and hurricanes, 19th century New
Orleans was resilient. Certainly, flooding and hurricanes frequented the city, yet these events did not result in massive
population loss or destruction of the majority of the housing
infrastructure. Damage occurred, but it was repairable.
Hence, community resilience was essentially intact — the
city was able to continue functioning without extensive external support from outside sources. However, when Katrina
struck, the degradation of the city’s resilience was evident.
Not only was the damage and loss of life extraordinary, recovery required massive federal aid in the form of emergency
response, disaster aid grants, and funds for the repair and rebuilding of the levee system. Moreover, New Orleans
promptly lost over half its population, and ultimately had a
net loss of 110,000 in 2010 out of 455,188 residents prior to
the hurricane. Ninety percent of the city’s neighborhoods lost
residents, including 17 neighborhoods that had not experienced flooding (Plyer, 2011). The repopulation of New Orleans that has occurred has required nearly $3 million (as of
February 2011) rebuilding grants to homeowners (Road
Home, 2011). Especially hard hit were the African-American
neighborhoods of the Ninth Ward and East Orleans. The
Ninth Ward had relatively high ground levels, but its protective levees failed due to a heightened storm surge prompted
by more modification to waterways (shipping outlets) to the
Gulf. When the wall of water that burst into the neighborhood
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swept dozens of homes off their foundations, post-Katrina recovery commissions sought to turn the neighborhood into
green space or argue that it had to “prove” viability before
funds would be used to assist recovery (Freudenburg et al.,
2010; Green et al., 2007).
Hurricane Katrina also damaged the agricultural, aquaculture, and forestry sectors. With the degraded wetland protection, hurricane flood waters deposited salt on 35,000 acres
of sugarcane cropland, causing a nine percent reduction in
Louisiana’s sugarcane production that year. Two sugarcane
refining plants closed due to damage and the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) reassigned quotas to
Midwest sugar beet producers (Commodity Credit Corporation, 2006; Tomson, 2005). Poultry farmers lost five million
chickens; dairy farmers lost 10,000 cattle (Cohn, 2005). In
Louisiana, nearly all oyster beds were covered with silt and
contaminants, with direct losses of $1.1 billion and an estimated two years needed for recovery (Buck, 2005). High
winds caused breaking and shearing damage to over 60 percent of timber stands; timber prices plummeted overnight,
and with them, the savings of tens of thousands of small-scale
landowners (Cormier, 2006; Gillette, 2006; Wang & Xu,
2009).
Katrina’s damage also highlighted how dependent these
sectors were on external inputs and regional infrastructure.
Fuel scarcity and loss of electricity for cooling, water pumps,
feeding machines, and refrigeration resulted in milk dumping
and egg spoilage (Clarke, 2005; Jeter, 2005). On the coast,
storm surge destroyed docks, electrical systems, and processing equipment. Slow recovery of large handler-processors
meant that many smaller processors had to delay opening
even after they had successfully replaced their equipment.
Fishers had nowhere to go to obtain ice, fuel, or sell their
catch (Buck, 2005).
Damage to the Port of New Orleans significantly
blocked the flow of commodity crops out of the 33 states that
ship grain exports through the Mississippi outlet (Plume,
2005). Immediately following the storm, 300 Cargill, Inc.
barges on the river loaded with corn, soy, and wheat could not
find a port to offload (Barrionuevo & Deutsch, 2005) and 86
ships queued at the river’s entrance had to be diverted elsewhere (Frittelli, 2005). The disaster reduced the traffic on the
Mississippi River by 90 percent in September 2005, leading
Midwest farmers along the Mississippi to scramble for more
expensive rail and road transportation alternatives to getting
product to market (Walker, 2005). In November, Gulf Coast
ports were operating at two-thirds capacity due to labor and
housing shortages (Gallagher, 2005; Plume, 2005). Altogether, the American Farm Bureau Federation estimated that Katrina caused $1 billion in direct losses to crops and livestock,
and an additional $1 billion in indirect costs associated with
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the degradation of the waterway shipping network and increased fuel costs (Hagstrom, 2005).
The damage to the agriculture, aquaculture, and forestry
sectors was so severe that extensive federal support was needed. USDA spent $10.7 million unloading barges and provided freight subsidies for shipment out of northern ports
(Plume, 2005). Direct loss was covered under USDA’s federal crop insurance, non-insured crop disaster assistance program, and emergency disaster loans (Buck, 2005; Schnepf &
Chite, 2005). The federal government also set up the firstever national level, forestry-based disaster relief program
(Gillette, 2006). While these sectors had impressive outputs
on the national and global scale during stable periods, they
needed considerable subsidies and policy support when faced
with a predictable, and not infrequent hurricane disturbance,
to say nothing of seasonal flooding and drought.
Stability in socio-ecological systems: Agricultural policy
Katrina provides a good example of how an emphasis on
stability over resilience can result in disastrous consequences. In the context of agricultural policy and the industrial scale of agriculture it supports, protection from commodity market variability can be compared with flood protection through structural engineering projects such as dikes,
seawalls, and levees. The perceived safety in stability in fact
leaves those “behind the walls” ill-prepared for the next large
flood (or, the next energy price spike); rather, protective,
(price) stabilizing policy may compromise adaptive approaches to, for example, energy conservation. Further, New
Orleans residents (or U.S. farmers) may have unreasonable
expectations that the risk of catastrophic disaster is low and
that government support itself is timely and reliable.
For decades, the primary emphasis in agricultural policy
(and financial credit and research extension) has been in
maximizing yields relative to land and labor inputs, i.e., in increasing productivity (Pimentel et al., 2008; Roberts, 2008),
and in so doing, protecting U.S. agriculture from certain
kinds of economic disturbances. This kind of thinking resulted in a large intervention — the agricultural adjustment acts
of the 1930’s (and subsequent authorizations of commodityspecific price support and supply controls, known as the U.S.
Farm Bills). Such policy was in response to the most significant disturbance, arguably, to affect U.S. agriculture in the
past 100 years — the 1930’s disastrous “Dust Bowl,” when
the Great Plains suffered from years of severe drought and
“black blizzards,” and eroded top soil across vast swaths of
the country (Worster, 2004). Possibly the worst climatological event in U.S. agricultural history coincided with the Great
Depression, one of the worst economic events in the country’s history.
Originally intended as a short-term, emergency measure
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to stop the dramatic decline of farm prices, price supports and
supply management nevertheless remained a policy strategy
through the 1996 Farm Bill, and continue today although the
relative share for such programs continues to wane (Effland,
2000). Today, about 11% of Farm Bill annual average expenditure is for commodity programs, down significantly from
the 35% in the 2002 Farm Bill (Smith, 2008).
Legislation continues to move farmers towards fewer
price supports or direct payments while favoring export crop
production and marketing for a global economy (Effland,
2000). The programs resulting from the Farm Bill are serving
a different kind of agricultural economy, one dominated by
industrial farms rather than small, independent producers.
Should Farm Bills continue then to authorize direct income
support tied to price fluctuations? It could be argued that the
equity aspects (privileging large-scale operations, and in only
a handful of commodities) negate the benefits of a high volume of production (Effland, 2000).
One of the clearest effects of U.S. agricultural policy, as
best represented by the Farm Bills, was to increase and intensify inputs in production — for example, relatively-low
priced chemicals. Further, the high demands for uniformity
of shape and maturation time of produce resulted in an influx
of breeding and machine technology, increasing production
and efficiency (relative to labor and land) (Dimitri et al.,
2005). At the same time, farm numbers have dropped, with
U.S. farms declining from 7 million to about 2 million since
the 1930s (Johnson, 2003; Keeney & Kemp, 2002).
Optimizing production relative to land and labor has
consequences — on efficiency of other resources (most notably, energy) and for equity concerns. Policy raises income
by raising prices so benefits accrue to those who produce the
most. Thus, a relatively small number of farmers, receive
benefits. This subsidy to capital intensity for larger-scale
farmers is given at the expense of taxpayers, but benefits may
not be sufficiently high to offset the social consequences of a
decline in number of farms.
Technology, too, accounts for high production, and industrialization of agriculture, “leaving the remaining operators with little time for ‘luxuries’ such as biodiversity, environment, and rural development” (Keeney & Kemp, 2002, p.
7). Another change influencing the effectiveness of policies
that contribute to declining farm numbers and loss of biodiversity is that, today, over 90% of farm household income is
derived from off-farm sources. This is a very different environment to that of the 1930s when the program was targeted
for those whose main income was derived from farming
(Dimitri et al., 2005; Effland, 2000).
In terms of the ecological integrity of agricultural systems, policy programs focused on ever-greater productivity
promote a lack of biodiversity by encouraging farmers to
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plant few varieties of seed and keep land, even marginal land,
in production (Santelmann et al., 2004). The U.S. Farm Bill
seeks to address such vulnerabilities with its various conservation provisions — an attempt perhaps to increase the ability to adapt to disturbances (Tompkins & Adger, 2004; Vogel
et al., 2007). However, these programs remain voluntary (approximately 8% of total funds are for conservation programs,
including options for land retirement and preservation, as
well as to promote some best practices on working lands).
In terms of economic resilience, insurance is made more
costly and more limited in scope because of uneven commodity prices and increasing losses due to various disasters
(due, in part, to the low-diversity of production) (Natcher &
Weaver, 2001). Overall, agricultural policy, although providing fiscal resources, emphasizes productivity relative to labor
and land resources, at the expense of the efficiency of other
factors such as energy, which is an increasingly significant
input (Pimentel et al., 2008). More importantly, it may have
the effect of reducing the range of the perceived normal operating conditions and rapid, effective response — in effect,
decreasing adaptive capacity.
In short, U.S. Farm Bills have represented a major attempt to reduce historic vulnerabilities in U.S. agriculture.
Given the specific conditions of the Dust Bowl years, such a
response was considered a means of boosting the sustainability of U.S. agriculture. But it could hardly be interpreted as
part of a coherent long-term policy focused on resilience and
sustainability. Rather, it was an emergency response to aid
those on the brink of economic collapse due to plummeting
crop prices.
Since the 1930s, technology has developed, the country
has urbanized, and the economic system continues to be dynamic. Yet approaches in federal support largely has remained the same. Moreover, the long duration of these onceeffective programs has produced entrenched interests and the
expectation of government assistance in times of need. This
results in less flexibility and willingness to change production strategies (for example, in crop rotations). This policy
approach is a good example of optimizing one factor —
prices. Emphasis is put on production for global markets, but
not necessarily on maintaining diversity of numbers and sizes
of farms within the domestic sector. Consumers may benefit
through lower food prices, but they also pay for it through
their tax dollars.
Non-conventional agriculture in the U.S. also is subject
to stabilizing- and resilience-reducing strategies. More
specifically, federal policy authorizing the National Organic
Program/Organic Rule has had a broad spectrum of consequences for scale of operation. In Northwestern Washington
state in 2010, suspected herbicide (aminopyralid) contamination of conventional dairy manure used on organic farms was
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reported (Burrows & MacConnell, 2010). Application of this
contaminated manure (resulting from cattle grazing on pastures treated with the herbicide) is thought to have caused severe crop damage in broadleaf plants and continued contamination of organic fields with a potent, slow-degrading herbicide. Such contamination may have affected almost all organic farmers in the area who procured their manure from
off-farm sources. Conventional sources of manure are allowed under the U.S .Department of Agriculture’s National
Organic Program and Rule (in fact, they may be essential
given the scale of organic production across the country). Yet
the “stability” represented by a readily available, concentrated source of nutrients in industrial sources of manure may
have, in fact, increased vulnerabilities of producers through
sharply reducing yields, as well as undermining consumer
trust in “certified organic” produce. To allow for conventional sources of soil fertility results in corporate-size scales of
production, but may affect producers of all scales by increasing risks as described above (Sullivan, 2011).

Further discussion: Resilience in agriculture
Large disturbances are becoming more frequent and
raising questions about the sustainability of U.S. agriculture:
global climate change, volatile energy markets, localized natural hazards such as flooding, and effects of regulations on
technology use and labor supply (Sumner, 2007). Some areas
of the country continue to lose a competitive edge to other regions with, say, more favorable climate or adequate labor
supply (Stöckle et al., 2009).
While system productivity may keep the monetary cost of
food low, policy may undermine or at the very least impose
market disadvantages for smaller, more innovative growers
(Ryden, 2007). It privileges large farms, resulting in a structure (size-distribution) of agriculture that is skewed. Diversity, thus, is compromised. Yet such diversity of scale of operations is necessary for a robust agriculture. Perhaps the innovative nature of small-farms can be seen in their disproportionately high enrollment in conservation programs and in crop diversification strategies (Berardi & Lunde, 2008). Further,
smaller producers are at times better suited to respond quickly to market needs, thus adapting supply to demand (Hall et
al., 2004; Wiggens, 2009). The problem arises, as argued here,
when agricultural policy favors one scale of production over
another. Such concerns raise questions about whether a different type of farm bill, one not tied to efficiency of land, labor,
and/or production, might foster the diversity — and hence resilience — desirable in agricultural systems.
The 2002 Farm Bill marked a real change with its Conservation Security Program. This Program contained many
conservation and environmental provisions to reduce pollu-
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tion, protect the landscape, and support small farmer livelihoods (Keeney & Kemp, 2002). Provisions in the Bill signaled a reduced focus on commodities and intensification and
more emphasis on environment and energy concerns, as well
as on integrated farming systems (Keeney & Kemp, 2002).
For example, the Bill specifies support for diversified resource-conserving crop rotation systems and managed rotational grazing systems, as well as conservation buffers. More
recently, the Conservation Stewardship Program, authorized
by the 2008 Farm Bill, has replaced the Conservation Security Program. Both programs promote diversity in operations
— with commodities interspersed with resource-conserving
crops in four-to-six year cycles and with livestock grazing on
more pasture and feeding on more forage (and also a wider
variety of feed grain: oats, barley, and wheat, rather than just
soy and corn). Also required are longer periods of soil vegetative cover during the year, and use of perennials as protection for riparian zones and for loss of soil.
It should not be difficult to design a “resilience” component to be required for participation in farm commodity programs. Program participants currently are required to comply
with Conservation and Wetland standards in return for marketing assistance loans. Yet steps to reduce vulnerability or
risk could be more formalized in farm planning and plans.
County or regional farm services agencies could assist. Besides showing a mere history of number of acres planted to a
particular commodity crop, farmers also could show ways in
which they are reducing specific risks. As an example, threats
from urban sprawl, with high land rents and nuisance ordinances resulting, might invite consideration of taking advantage of new markets and higher-valued crops sought by new
neighboring residents.
Threats from flooding could prompt farmers to consider
a change in land use to extensive grazing systems or certain
permaculture practices. Threats related to large, centralized
sources of inputs (herbicide-laden dairy manure for organic
farms, or large-scale, improperly-stored and aflatoxin- contaminated forage) could be addressed by diversifying sources
and types of inputs. Threats involving high external energy
use and extreme price spikes could prompt farmers to make a
more concerted effort in on-site energy production and more
self-sufficiency through energy conservation. All of these
strategies could be part of a program-enrollment process
and/or written into farm plans. Showing evidence of reducing
vulnerability to such extreme events should be a prerequisite
for participation in commodity programs, and accessing the
resources they provide.
Vulnerability-reducing examples exist elsewhere, as in
the case of New Zealand where subsidies were eliminated in
2009 (Federated Farmers, 2002). In this case, a major perturbation sent shock waves through the New Zealand farm sec-
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tor — with a sudden elimination of farm subsidies in that
country resulting. Questions regarding what scale of agriculture was able to adapt most quickly, and how — are still the
subject of much discussion. Researchers MacLeod and
Moller (2006) contend that there is evidence for intensification and diversification, with a complex series of adjustments
resulting within livestock and crop production, but within
labor markets as well (with a higher proportion of income
from off-farm sources resulting). Others have commented on
shifts in grazing of marginal land, which is now grazed less
intensively and have reported positive changes in the structure of agriculture, in terms of diversity of size of farms (Federated Farmers, 2002).

Concluding remarks
Today, the U.S. agricultural sector continues to emphasize industrial forms of production of cereals, dairy products,
and other crops for export. This emphasis on efficiency and
stability (in terms of commodity production) degrades resilience in several ways: through the reduction of diversity in
size, type, and style of producer, as well as through the decreased ability to change (to the extent infrastructure investments allow) among crop production systems; and, through
the reduction of adaptive capacity by stabilizing cyclical variation in prices. Together, they reduce adaptive capacity (Smit
& Wandel, 2006), and lock-in entrenched interests, bureaucracy, and political and economic power (Allison & Hobbes,
2004) in a cycle of stagnation that defeats the original purpose of the policy — to sustain a healthy agricultural sector.
Food continues to be abundant in the U.S., food prices
are seemingly low, and there seems to be little opposition to
change (indeed, it is relatively easy to organize farm operators who benefit most from the Farm Bill) — support is considerable. Yet, diversity in farms size and type results in a diverse production of food and environmental goods and services (Reidsma & Ewert, 2008; Santelmann et al., 2004).
Clearly, some consumers, enjoying both rural landscapes and
local produce, are willing to pay for such services in a multifunctional landscape, either through taxes or through food
prices.
It is clear that U.S. agricultural policy is driven by commercialization, and vested interests. It may be that policymakers inherently desire a “resilient,” “sustainable,” and “stable” system, though their conception of what these entail may
include the perpetuation of an industrial model of agriculture.
Nevertheless, the emphasis on stability in agricultural policy
and programs is an outdated conceptualization of the means
to achieve a system capable of persisting — i.e., a sustainable
system. We continue to live in a dynamic world of environmental, economic and social constraints that are constantly at

Human Ecology Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011

Berardi, Green & Hammond

odds with each other. Policy needs to change accordingly.
On a broader scale, a resilient agricultural sector would
maintain the ability to adapt to, learn from, and recover from
disturbances to normal operating conditions, while continuing to provide the goods and services that support food, feed,
and fiber production. Unfortunately, many agricultural programs tend to favor stability-enhancing management strategies with little attention to resiliency. Yet tax-supported programs need not support the least resilient agriculture possible. Policy can be rewritten so that efforts are made to reduce
vulnerability to disturbances. Whether the disturbance is a recurrent pest problem, high energy prices, water scarcity, or a
new threat, the usual strategies are still available — technology adoption, government support. But, whither the farm resilience, personal innovation and daring, or the acknowledgement of the time necessary to develop a package of tools to
better adapt to the next big hazard? How indeed will federal
support manifest itself for such an effort and allow for the
emergence of a less hazardous U.S. agriculture across scale
and time? Certainly examples exist, as in the case of New
Zealand. Now it is time for the U.S. to consider resilience
thinking in farm policy.
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